When the court itself breaks the law
Our legal disputes in Tbilisi City Court are proceeding amid numerous procedural violations and unreasoned decisions. In many instances the legal basis for the court's interim decisions is unclear: the court does not observe the deadlines it has set, parties receive different answers to requests of identical substance, decisions go unreasoned, and a case continues to be heard when the conclusion of another, parallel dispute could directly affect its outcome. And in most instances, all of this works to the advantage of the same side.
Before turning to the specific violations we have identified in our cases, it is important to be clear from the outset about who the parties to this dispute are.
On one side are my husband Davit Tsetskhladze and I, Natia Janashia. We are the family that founded, built from nothing, and spent almost twenty years developing the British-Georgian Academy and the British International School of Tbilisi. On the other side stands Georgia Education Group LLC, successor to Georgia Capital.
To protect the schools, we filed a derivative claim in the name of the British-Georgian Academy against Georgia Education Group.
And this is where the most absurd part of the story begins. In the other cases described below, the claimants against us are the very companies we founded — the British-Georgian Academy and the British International School of Tbilisi. We are contesting in court the lawfulness of Georgia Education Group's control over those schools, and we are asking for its expulsion from partnership in the British-Georgian Academy. Behind Georgia Education Group stand Georgia Capital PLC (LSE: CGEO) and Irakli Gilauri, against whom we also have proceedings in the United Kingdom.
This is no longer a matter of individual decisions — it is a matter of the right to a fair trial. Everyone is entitled to have their case heard by an independent and impartial court, in accordance with the law and the principles of equality, regardless of who the other side is, how large their financial resources are, or how influential they may be.
In the entries that follow we will set out in detail the alarming facts that accompany these proceedings and that, in our view, point to serious problems within the judicial system.
We will present the facts. The conclusions we leave to you.
Fact №1: Procedural deadlines are not the same for everyone
Judge: Ketevan Kurtskhalia (case №2/30846-25)
In this case the court plainly breached elementary principles of procedural law.
The law is unambiguous. When a defendant receives a claim, it has a strictly defined period in which to file a response. Failure to meet that deadline carries a specific legal consequence.
That, at least, is how it is supposed to work.
In our case, events unfolded as follows:
Our claim was served on the defendant, Georgia Education Group. The court gave it ten days to respond.
The defendant filed a formal, unreasoned response and asked for additional time.
The court issued no ruling granting an extension.
The defendant nonetheless filed a full response, in breach of every deadline set by the law and by the court itself.
We asked the court not to accept the late response and to apply the consequences the law provides for. The court refused. We have received no written reasons explaining how a document filed out of time came to be accepted.
So: no ruling extending the deadline exists; the court never considered the request; the deadline it had set expired; and yet the late response was accepted, while our lawful request was refused.
One question for the court:
If the court itself set the deadline for filing a response, and no ruling extending that deadline exists, on what legal basis did it accept a response filed out of time?
When the court itself breaks the law
Fact №2: When the claimant brings the counterclaim as well
Judge: Ketevan Kurtskhalia (case №2/30846-25)
In case №2/30846-25 the claimant is British-Georgian Academy LLC and the defendant is Georgia Education Group LLC. Our claim asks for Georgia Education Group, the Academy's 70% partner, to be expelled from the company.
About six months later, a counterclaim against Natia Janashia was brought in the same case.
This is where the question arises.
Under Article 188 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, only the defendant may bring a counterclaim. In this case the defendant is Georgia Education Group LLC.
Yet in the counterclaim as filed, the claimant is again named as British-Georgian Academy LLC, and the defendant as Natia Janashia.
The result is the following procedural situation:
Original claim
British-Georgian Academy LLC
Georgia Education Group LLC
Counterclaim
British-Georgian Academy LLC
Natia Janashia
So British-Georgian Academy LLC is the claimant in both the original claim and the counterclaim.
We put precisely this point to the court and asked for the counterclaim to be left without consideration. The court refused our motion and admitted the claim to proceedings.
The court has provided no written reasons explaining on what legal basis this claim can be treated as a "counterclaim" when it was not brought by the defendant to the original claim.
This is not merely a technical detail. It is a fundamental question: who does the law give the right to bring a counterclaim, and can a court set that rule aside and allow a practice contrary to the law without proper reasons?
One question for the court:
If the law gives the right to bring a counterclaim to the defendant, how can the claimant in the original claim become the claimant in the "counterclaim" too?
When the court itself breaks the law
Fact №3: A decision without reasons
Judge: Ketevan Kurtskhalia (case №2/30846-25)
In the previous entry we set out why the admission of the counterclaim makes no legal sense. But there is a second problem in this case, no less important: to this day the court has given us no written answer to the question of what legal basis it admitted that claim on.
We have asked the court for reasons more than once, orally and in writing. We want to know what legal logic the court relied on: did it apply the rule on derivative claims, did it grant a particular party's motion, or did it proceed on some other basis unknown to us? We have still had no answer.
This matters as a point of principle, because giving reasons for a decision is not a formality. It goes directly to a party's right to defend its interests properly and to make effective use of the right of appeal. If a party does not know the court's reasoning, it plainly becomes impossible to prepare a well-founded and complete appeal for the higher court.
There is one more thing worth noting. On almost every question of real importance, the judge left the courtroom to reach her decision. She is of course fully entitled to do so. But if a question is difficult enough to require retiring to consider it, that makes it all the more necessary that the parties afterwards receive full legal reasons for the decision. In our case that is precisely what did not happen.
Despite this, Judge Ketevan Kurtskhalia not only failed to issue a reasoned ruling — according to what our side recorded at the hearing, when our lawyers asked her once again for a written explanation, she stated that she did not intend to prepare written reasons on the matter.
What we are left with is a situation in which the court admitted the counterclaim, refused our motion, and at the same time directly declined to give written reasons for its own decision.
One question for the court:
If the court will not tell you what legal basis it decided on, how are you supposed to appeal that decision?
When the court itself breaks the law